网络游戏赌博性质分析

网络游戏产业快速发展的同时,赌博现象混迹其中。网络游戏赌博与传统赌博只是形式上的不同,其实质就是一种赌博行为。只有从教育、法制、监督、自律四方面综合治理,才能使这个行业健康发展。     

军用认知无线电网络中功率控制博弈算法的探讨

通过对比军用认知无线功率控制博弈模型与一些经典的功率控制博弈算法,提出了一种认知无线电网络中的功率控制的博弈算法。通过仿真结果性能分析,证明算法具有一定的优越性,并且能够为军事无线通信提供一定的理论依据和现实作用。     

编队协同反导决策方案优选

为了充分地调度好编队全部的抗导资源,实现抗导弹群的成功概率最大,在利用随机服务系统理论对编队协同反导决策方案各指标值进行计算的基础上,将"模糊优选理论"与"协同学原理"有机地结合起来,求解了在反舰导弹到达强度与舰空导弹的单发杀伤概率在不同值的情况下,编队协同反导决策方案的隶属度,为编队指挥员进行反导决策方案的优选提供了科学依据。     

Efficiency of equilibria in restricted uniform machine scheduling with total weighted completion time as social cost

In the last decade, there has been much progress in understanding scheduling problems in which selfish jobs aim to minimize their individual completion time. Most of this work has focused on makespan minimization as social objective. In contrast, we consider as social cost the total weighted completion time, that is, the sum of the agent costs, a standard definition of welfare in economics. In our setting, jobs are processed on restricted uniform parallel machines, where each machine has a speed and is only capable of processing a subset of jobs; a job's cost is its weighted completion time; and each machine sequences its jobs in weighted shortest processing time (WSPT) order. Whereas for the makespan social cost the price of anarchy is not bounded by a constant in most environments, we show that for our minsum social objective the price of anarchy is bounded above by a small constant, independent of the instance. Specifically, we show that the price of anarchy is exactly 2 for the class of unit jobs, unit speed instances where the finite processing time values define the edge set of a forest with the machines as nodes. For the general case of mixed job strategies and restricted uniform machines, we prove that the price of anarchy equals 4. From a classical machine scheduling perspective, our results establish the same constant performance guarantees for WSPT list scheduling. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012     

地方物流供应商“偷懒”行为监管机制研究

军民融合现代军事物流体系中,地方物流供应商往往会"偷懒",这必将损害军民融合现代军事物流体系的整体绩效。首先描述了"偷懒"行为及其危害性,从机制入手,基于博弈论建立地方物流供应商"偷懒"行为监管机制;分析并证明了监管机制的有效性。这一机制的构建对于监管地方物流供应商具有重要作用。     

Reconciling strategic studies … with itself: a common framework for choosing among strategies

Three distinct, and seemingly irreconcilable, schools of thought are identified within the strategic studies literature. One which searches for “universal principles of war,” a second, “context-dependent,” approach that seeks to embed each instance of warfare within its concurrent social, political, technological milieu and, finally a “paradoxical logic” school, which equates strategy with the generation of uncertainty. The author offers some intuitive concepts from non-cooperative game theory to develop a “dominate-mix” approach to strategy choice. In doing so, he helps to reconcile these disparate approaches and provides a simple framework to assist researchers in framing military decisions as well as to assist planners in choosing among strategies.     

Interchange fee rate,merchant discount rate,and retail price in a credit card network: A game‐theoretic analysis

We consider two game‐theoretic settings to determine the optimal values of an issuer's interchange fee rate, an acquirer's merchant discount rate, and a merchant's retail price in a credit card network. In the first setting, we investigate a two‐stage game problem in which the issuer and the acquirer first negotiate the interchange fee rate, and the acquirer and the retailer then determine their merchant discount rate and retail price, respectively. In the second setting, motivated by the recent US bill “H.R. 2695,” we develop a three‐player cooperative game in which the issuer, the acquirer, and the merchant form a grand coalition and bargain over the interchange fee rate and the merchant discount rate. Following the cooperative game, the retailer makes its retail pricing decision. We derive both the Shapley value‐ and the nucleolus‐characterized, and globally‐optimal unique rates for the grand coalition. Comparing the two game settings, we find that the participation of the merchant in the negotiation process can result in the reduction of both rates. Moreover, the stability of the grand coalition in the cooperative game setting may require that the merchant should delegate the credit card business only to the issuer and the acquirer with sufficiently low operation costs. We also show that the grand coalition is more likely to be stable and the U.S. bill “H.R. 2695” is thus more effective, if the degree of division of labor in the credit card network is higher as the merchant, acquirer, and issuer are more specialized in the retailing, acquiring, and issuing operations, respectively. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012     

有人/无人战斗机协同空战模式及能力需求分析

针对未来空战的特点对有人/无人战斗机协同空战的作战模式及能力需求进行了研究.从信息链到武器链时空过渡的角度分析了有人/无人机协同空战的作战优势;提出了两种典型的有人/无人机协同空战方式,并给出了作战过程描述及功能结构分析;基于“观测-评估-决策-执行”指挥控制环分析了有人/无人机协同空战的指挥控制流程;基于协同空战的任务需求提出各参与平台的能力需求.此研究对有人/无人机协同空战的发展具有一定的指导意义.     

CEC条件下的舰艇编队防空问题

未来战争是"海、陆、空、电、天"五位一体的高技术战争,机动战、火力战和信息战将贯穿于作战的全过程.面对这样一种局面,传统的水面舰艇编队防空作战样式必将发生重大变革以适应未来海战的需要.美国海军针对上述情况研究了协同作战能力(CEC),并将其推广应用于各种指挥系统.CEC已经成为一种提高指挥系统协同作战能力的重要技术,通过使每个独立平台成为战斗群的延伸来弥补单个平台的弱点.借鉴了网络中心战的思想并结合美军提出的CEC,分析了CEC条件下的我水面舰艇编队的防空问题.     

一种基于博弈论的无线网状网络路由与信道分配联合优化算法

无线网络中的路由与信道分配可极大地影响网络的性能.为了解决无线网状网络中的路由与信道分配问题,提出并研究了一种称为CRAG(基于博弈论的无线网状网络路由与信道分配联合优化)的方法.CRAG采用协同博弈的方式将网络中的每个节点模型化为一个弈者,每个弈者的策略为与其相关的路由与信道分配方案,收益函数为给定流量需求矩阵下的成功传输流量.弈者通过协同博弈来优化收益函数以最大化网络的吞吐量.基于NS3的仿真结果表明,CRAG在收敛性、时延、丢包率和吞吐量方面优于其他当前的算法,从而证明了协同博弈的方法可以用于无线网状网络的路由与信道分配联合优化,并有效地改进网络性能.